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Abstract
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain
policy proposals, their choice will have an inuence on the behavior of op-
posing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy
proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic
has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with
a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there
is a subgame perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coin-
cide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one
that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no
rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures
would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.
JEL classication: D72
Keywords: Interest groups; Endogenous lobbying targets, Voluntary re-
straint; Polarization
Zusammenfassung
Wenn eine Lobbygruppe sich bindend auf einen Politikvorschlag festlegen
kann, bevor sie in einen Lobbywettkampf mit einer anderen Gruppe tritt,
dann hat sie einen Anreiz zu strategischer Zurückhaltung: Kommt sie der
anderen Gruppe ein wenig entgegen, so entschärft das den Wettkampf zwis-
chen den Gruppen. Diese Idee ist kürzlich in einer Reihe von Aufsätzen
untersucht worden. Ich trage zu dem Thema bei, indem ich einen vollständig
diskriminierenden Wettkampf als Modell für den Lobbywettkampf verwende.
Es existiert ein teilspielperfektes Gleichgewicht, in dem beide Lobbygrup-
pen dieselbe Politik vorschlagen, und zwar diejenige, die ihre gemeinsame
Wohlfahrt maximiert. Dieses Gleichgewicht ist das einzige, das wiederholte
Elimination dominierter Strategien überlebt. Folglich kämpfen die Grupen
nicht wirklich, und es gibt keine Rentendissipation. Ein Politiker der versucht
die Lobbyausgaben zu maximieren würde einen unvollständig diskriminieren-
den Wettkampf vorziehen.
1 Introduction
Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy
proposals, their choice will have an inuence on the behavior of opposing
lobbyists. This leads to a moderation in the policy proposals, as has been
shown by a number of recent papers.1 The most thorough study of this e¤ect
is Epstein and Nitzan (2004). They study a two stage game with two interest
groups, where in stage one policy proposals are chosen, and in stage two the
interest groups engage in a lobbying contest about the proposed policies.
Epstein and Nitzan show that, in equilibrium, an interest group will not
propose its most preferred policy. Instead, the groups will moderate their
proposals.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose policy proposals can
be chosen from R. The ideal point of group one is 0, the ideal point of group
two is 1, and payo¤s are strictly monotonic over [0; 1]. If interest group one
moderates its policy proposal from 0 to some small" > 0; there are two
e¤ects. On the one hand, the groups payo¤ from winning the contest is
lowered. On the other hand, the incentive lobbying group two has to lobby
for its own policy proposal is reduced, since its payo¤ from losing the contest
has increased. This makes group two less aggressive, which benets group
one. The rst (negative) e¤ect is a second order one if the moderation starts
from group ones ideal point where the rst-order condition holds. However,
the moderation has a rst order e¤ect on the aggressiveness of the opposing
group, so the second (positive) e¤ect dominates. Therefore, the group gains
from moderating its proposal. In equilibrium, there is strategic restraint.
On the other hand, Epstein and Nitzan show that the equilibrium policy
proposals do not coincide (see their proposition 2). As I will show, this is
due to the assumption that the contest is imperfectly discriminating.2
The purpose of this note is to reconsider strategic restraint in a perfectly
1Leidy (1994) studies a monopolist facing a consumer opposition and shows that the
monopolist has an incentive to self-regulate to produce a higher quantity. Epstein and
Nitzan (2002) reconsider the true social cost of monopoly taking this e¤ect into account,
and study applications to immigration policy (2003). Aidt (2002) has a related result
concerning strategic nonparticipation.
2All the papers cited in footnote 1 share this assumption.
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discriminating contest. The two types of contest di¤er in the relationship
assumed between the size of the lobbying expenditures and the probabil-
ity of winning the contest. In a perfectly discriminating contest a player
who spends more than his opponent wins with probability one, so small dif-
ferences are decisive, whereas in an imperfectly discriminating contest the
probability that a given group wins is a continuous function of the lobbying
expenditures.3 The perfectly discriminating contest is an important tool in
the study of lobbying contests [see, among others, Hillman and Riley (1989),
Ellingsen (1991), Baye et al. (1993 and 1996) with further references, Che
and Gale (1998)] and has been applied in other contexts as well [e.g. Konrad
(2000a and 2000b)]. Hence it is interesting to see how results change if we
assume a perfectly discriminating contest.
I show that the incentives for strategic restraint are even stronger with
a perfectly discriminating contest. Policy proposals will coincide in the only
subgame perfect equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. The policy proposals maximize the joint welfare of the two lob-
bying groups. Results are thus quite di¤erent in the case of a perfectly dis-
criminating contest. My paper also sheds new light on rent dissipation: since
the lobbying groups propose the same policy, they do not spend anything on
lobbying. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all.
The type of a lobbying contest is often viewed as largely determined by
the political culture and laws. However, as Che and Gale (1997) point out,
it is also possible to think of the type of a contest as chosen by a politician
who has to make a decision about the issue at stake. While the politician
cannot auction o¤ her decision openly, she can consistently decide in favour
of the lobbying group that makes the highest expenditures, and so create a
perfectly discriminating contest. On the other hand, the politician can cre-
ate an imperfectly discriminating contest by introducing some randomness
into the determination of the winner. She could randomize literally. More
importantly, as OKeefe, Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1984) argue, the politician
3In the language of auction theory, a completely discriminating contest is a rst price
all pay auction. The lottery model of Tullock (1975, 1980), in which the probability that
a given lobby group will win is proportional to its relative expenditure, is a well known
special case of an imperfectly discriminating contest.
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can choose how precisely she monitors the lobbying expenditures. If she is
not completely informed about all the expenditures, then, from the point of
view of the lobbying groups, there is again some randomness in the deter-
mination of the winner: spending more than the opposing group does not
ensure victory, because the politician might fail to notice.
What type of contest would the politician prefer? This, of course, de-
pends on her objectives. If her aim is to maximize lobbying expenditures
because she can appropriate part of them, she would prefer an imperfectly
discriminating contest. In this respect, my paper provides imperfectly dis-
criminating contests with a microfoundation. On the other hand, a benevo-
lent social planner who wants to minimze rent dissipation would prefer the
perfectly discriminating contest.
My paper is related to Che and Gale (1997) and Fang (2002) who compare
the lottery model with the perfectly discriminating contest. However, these
papers do not study endogenous policy proposals.
2 The model
There are two interest groups, i = 1; 2. Following Epstein and Nitzan (2004)
I treat each group as a unied actor and abstract from free riding within the
group. In stage one of the game, the groups simultaneously and indepen-
dently choose their policy proposals yi 2 R: Their preferences for policies are
given by utility functions ui : R! R that measure the monetary equivalent
of a policy being enacted. The ideal point of group one is 0, the ideal point
of group two is 1. The utility functions are strictly monotonic over [0; 1] :
Further, I assume that there is a unique policy
y = argmax
y2R
(u1 (y) + u2 (y)) (1)
that maximizes joint welfare of the two lobbying groups.
After observing their rivals policy proposal, in stage two of the game the
interest groups choose lobbying outlays x1 and x2: The group that chooses the
higher outlay wins the lobbying contest and its policy proposal is enacted.
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Ties are broken randomly. The groups are risk neutral, and therefore the
payo¤ vi of group i = 1; 2 is
vi =
8><>:
ui (yi)  xi; if xi > xj;
ui (yj)  xi; if xi < xj;
1
2
(ui (yi) + ui (yj))  xi; if xi = xj:
(2)
3 Analysis of the model
Consider the contest in stage two. Dene
si (yi; yj) := ui (yi)  ui (yj) : (3)
This is the stake that group i has in the contest. Using this notation we get
vi =
8><>:
si (yi; yj)  xi + ui (yj) ; if xi > xj;
 xi + ui (yj) ; if xi < xj;
1
2
si (yi; yj)  xi + ui (yj) ; if xi = xj:
(4)
In contrast to a standard all pay auction with valuations of the prize given
by s1 and s2; here s1 and s2 can be negative. Further, in the payo¤ functions
that describe the standard all pay auction there is no term corresponding to
the ui (yj) in equation (4) - but, since ui (yj) is constant in stage two of the
game, this is not an important di¤erence.
Suppose for the moment that s1 and s2 are both non-negative. That is,
each group prefers its own proposal to the proposal of its rival. The properties
of the equilibrium (which is in mixed strategies and unique) of the resulting
contest in stage two are well known4, so I will only note one fact which is
important here. In the equilibrium, the expected utility of group i is equal
4See Hillman and Riley (1989); Baye et al. (1996); and the textbook of Hirshleifer and
Riley (1992), Chapter 10.
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to
E (vi (yi; yj)) =
(
si (yi; yj)  sj (yj; yi) + ui (yj) ; if si (yi; yj) > sj (yj; yi)  0;
ui (yj) ; if sj (yj; yi)  si (yi; yj)  0:
(5)
In some subgames of the model, both groups prefer the proposal of the
other group.5 Then they choose x1 = x2 = 0. Therefore,
E (vi (yi; yj)) =
1
2
(ui (yi) + ui (yj)) ; if si (yi; yj) < 0 and sj (yj; yi) < 0: (6)
However, as we will see, these subgames will never be reached in equilibrium.
Consider now the choice of policy proposals in stage one of the game.
Lemma 1 For group 1 (2) each policy proposal y1 > y (y2 < y) is strictly
dominated by y:
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that a group will never propose a policy that is closer to the
ideal point of the other group than y: The following proposition shows that,
in every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, at least one group will propose
y:
Proposition 1 In every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, at
least one group (call it i) proposes the policy y that maximizes the joint wel-
fare of the two groups. The other group j is indi¤erent between all proposals
yj 2 fy juj (y)  uj (y)g :
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that y1 6= y 6= y2 in a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Then by the previous lemma, y1 < y < y2: But then it follows
from equation (5) and the fact that argmaxy (s2 (y; y1)  s1 (y1; y)) = y that
the unique best reply of group 2 to y1 is to propose y; a contradiction.
It follows that in any subgame perfect equilibrium at least one group
proposes y: Say yi = y: Then, by equation (5), E (vj (yj; y)) = uj (y) for
all yj 2 fy juj (y)  yg :
5Note that si (yi; yj) < 0 if and only if sj (yj ; yi) < 0:
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The intuition behind proposition 1 is as follows. In the perfectly discrim-
inating contest in stage two, expected utility in equilibrium depends on the
di¤erence in stakes. There are two ways in which a group i inuences the
di¤erence in stakes by its choice of yi: First, its stake si increases linearly in
the utility ui (yi) it gets if it wins the contest. Second, the stake sj of the rival
group decreases linearly in the utility uj (yi) the group j gets if group i wins
the contest. The two ways are equally important. Therefore, to maximize
the di¤erence in stakes, group i should choose yi so as to maximize the sum
of its own utility ui (yi) and the utility uj (yi) of its rival. More formally,
since
si (yi; yj)  sj (yj; yi) = ui (yi) + uj (yi)  (ui (yj) + uj (yj)) =
= ui (yi) + uj (yi) + terms independent of yi (7)
maximizing the di¤erence in stakes over yi amounts to maximizing the joint
welfare of both groups.
Proposition 1 implies that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
model with y1 = y2 = y. But there are many subgame perfect equilibria.
How should we select the most sensible? Note that stage one of the game is
solvable by iterated elimination of dominated strategies.6 Lemma 1 allows
us to eliminate all strategies involving yj with uj (yj) < uj (y) for j = 1; 2:
But, given that j will never play such a strategy, it is a weakly dominant
strategy of i to propose y : if yj 6= y; then yi = y is the unique best reply;
and if yj = y; then E (vi (yi; yj)) = ui (y) for all yi except those eliminated
by lemma 1. This proves
Proposition 2 There is a unique equilibrium of the reduced game given in
equations (5) and (6) that survives iterated elimination of dominated strate-
gies. In this equilibrium, both groups propose y:
Because of this proposition, we should expect y1 = y2 = y: It should
6Simply focussing on equilibria in undominated strategies has not much bite here. For
example, if group one chooses y1 = 1; then the best reply of group two is y2 = 1: Therefore,
proposing ones own ideal point is not a dominated strategy. On the other hand, proposing
y is not dominated either.
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be emphasized that this result is not based on any form of tacit collusion.
Rather, it is driven by the fact that a group can only lose, and never win,
from deviating from the policy proposal y; given that the other group doesnt
play a strictly dominated strategy.
Since the two groups propose the same policy, they dont spend anything
in the lobbying contest in stage two. Therefore, there is no rent dissipation
at all. This contrasts with the case of an imperfectly discriminating contest
studied by Epstein and Nitzan (2004). In their model, it always pays to
deviate at least slightly from the policy proposal of the other interest group.
In equilibrium, the two groups do not propose the same policy, and spend
some positive amount on lobbying in stage two of the game.
This di¤erence in ndings is due to the nature of the contest. In an im-
perfectly discriminating contest, the group that chooses the higher lobbying
outlay doesnt necessarily win. There is some noise in the determination
of the winner, and winning probabilities are continuous functions of the lob-
bying outlays. The di¤erence is similar to the di¤erence between a Downsian
median voter model (where winning probabilities are discontinuous and pol-
icy proposals coincide) and a probabilistic voting model (where there is some
noise in the determination of the winner and policy proposals often diverge7).
As argued in the introduction, one can view the nature of the contest as a
choice variable of a politician who has to decide over the issue at stake. What
type of contest would a politician prefer, if she wanted to maximize lobbying
expenditures? When policy proposals are endogenous, lobbying expenditures
are positive with an imperfectly discriminating contest, but they are zero if
the contest is perfectly discriminating. Therefore the politician would never
choose a perfectly discriminating contest. Summing up, we have
Corollary 1 When policy proposals are endogenous,
a) there is no rent dissipation in a perfectly discriminating contest,
b) a politician who wants to maximize lobbying expenditures always prefers
an imperfectly discriminating contest to a perfectly discriminating one.
It is interesting to compare this with the usual lobbying model where
7See, for example, Calvert (1985), theorem 5.
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policy proposals are exogenous. If the stakes of the lobbying groups are
symmetric, then, with exogenous proposals, rent dissipation is complete in
the perfectly discriminating contest, but incomplete in the imperfectly dis-
criminating one. The politician prefers the perfectly discriminating contest.
Surprisingly, the corollary shows that, with endogenous policy proposals, it
is just the other way round: there is no rent dissipation in the perfectly dis-
criminating contest, and it is never optimal for the politician to choose the
perfectly discriminating contest, even if the lobbying groups are symmetric.8
4 Conclusion
This paper considered the strategic choice of policy proposals in completely
discriminating contests. In equilibrium, both groups propose the same policy,
which maximizes the joint welfare of the groups. Therefore there is no rent
dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditure
would always prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.
5 Appendix: Proof of lemma 1
Lemma 1. For group 1 (2) each policy proposal y1 > y (y2 < y) is strictly
dominated by y:
Proof. I prove this lemma for group 1; the proof for group 2 is similar.
Fix a y1 > y: We want to show that E (v1 (y1; y2)) < E (v1 (y; y2)) for all
y2 2 R:
Case 1: y2  y:
Suppose group 1 proposes y1: Then both groups prefer the policy proposal
of the other group over their own policy proposal. Therefore, in stage two
x1 = x2 = 0; and E (v1 (y1; y2)) = 12 (u1 (y1) + u1 (y2)) :
On the other hand, if group 1 proposes y, both groups still prefer the pol-
icy proposal of the other group over their own policy proposals (or are indif-
8If proposals are exogenous, and the stakes of the lobbyists are asymmetric, an imper-
fectly discriminating contest sometimes leads to higher expected expenditures and rent
dissipation. See (e.g.) Fang (2002).
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ferent i¤ y2 = y), and therefore x1 = x2 = 0: It follows that E (v1 (y; y2)) =
1
2
(u1 (y
) + u1 (y2)) > E (v1 (y1; y2)) :
Case 2: y < y2  y1:
As in case 1, if group 1 proposes y1 it getsE (v1 (y1; y2)) = 12 (u1 (y1) + u1 (y2)) :
Notice that E (v1 (y1; y2))  u1 (y2) :
If group 1 proposes y then both groups prefer their own proposals over
that of the other group. But since
s1 (y
; y2)  s2 (y2; y) = u1 (y) + u2 (y)  (u1 (y2) + u2 (y2)) (8)
it follows from the denition of y that s1 (y; y2) > s2 (y2; y). Hence
E (v1 (y
; y2)) = s1 (y; y2)  s2 (y2; y) + u1 (y2) > (9)
> u1 (y2)  E (v1 (y1; y2)) : (10)
Case 3. y2 > y1:
Here, if group 1 proposes y1 it gets (see equation (5))
E (v1 (y1; y2)) = max fs1 (y1; y2)  s2 (y2; y1) ; 0g+ u1 (y2) : (11)
From equation (8) it follows that
s1 (y
; y2)  s2 (y2; y) > max fs1 (y1; y2)  s2 (y2; y1) ; 0g (12)
Therefore,
E (v1 (y
; y2)) = s1 (y; y2)  s2 (y2; y) + u1 (y2) > E (v1 (y1; y2)) : (13)
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